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Abstract
In this study we adopted a psychometric approach to examine how the body is 
subjectively experienced in a mirror. One hundred and twenty-four healthy 
participants viewed their body for five minutes directly or via a mirror, and then 
completed a 20-item questionnaire designed to capture subjective experiences of the 
body. PCA revealed a two-component structure for both direct and mirror conditions, 
comprising body evaluations (and alienation) and unusual feelings and perceptions. 
The relationship between these components and pre-existing tendencies for 
appearance anxiety, body dysmorphic-type beliefs, dissociative symptomatology, 
self-objectification and delusion ideation further supported the similarity between 
direct and mirror conditions; however, the occurrence of strange experiences like 
those reported to occur during prolonged face viewing was not confirmed. These 
results suggest that, despite obvious differences in visual feedback, observing the 
body via a mirror (as an outside observer) is subjectively equivalent to observing the 
body directly (from our own viewpoint).
Keywords: mirror; body experience; principal components analysis; self-observation
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1. Introduction
Mirrors allow us to view the physical appearance of our own face and body from an 
observer (third person) perspective. Moreover, self-recognition in a mirror is 
considered a measure of self-awareness (but see Rochat & Zahavi, 2011, for a critical 
discussion), with only humans and a few other animals possessing this capacity 
(Amsterdam, 1972; Gordon, 1970; Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006; Reiss & Marino, 
2001)(Amsterdam, 1972; Gordon, 1970; Plotnik et al., 2006; Reiss & Marino, 2001). 
However, a human’s relationship with mirrors and reflections goes beyond simple 
self-recognition, as we frequently use mirrors to perform complex actions (e.g. 
driving), as well as for self-grooming and checking our physical appearance. 
Interestingly, mirrors have such a strong association with viewing the self that we 
naturally assume individuals are using mirrors for self-observation even when the 
laws of physics make this impossible, known as the Venus effect (Bertamini, Latto, & 
Spooner, 2003; Bertamini, Lawson, Jones, & Winters, 2010).
What is more, deficits in self or body perception often involve a preoccupation 
with viewing the body that can be seen in their atypical interactions with mirrors; for 
example, individuals suffering from eating disorders, who are thought to have an 
abnormal experience of their body, often exhibit frequent body checking that involves 
mirrors, or conversely mirror avoidance (Shafran, Fairburn, Robinson, & Lask, 2004). 
Sufferers of body dysmorphic disorder can spend hours in front of a mirror or other 
reflective surface (Veale & Riley, 2001), and deficits in self processing following 
neurological damage can result in a failure to recognise one’s own reflection (Phillips, 
1996). Mirrors can also alleviate pathological symptoms involving the self/body 
experience; for example, patients with somatoparaphrenia who deny ownership of 
their limbs following brain injury have been found to have ownership temporarily 
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reinstated when viewing their disowned limb via a mirror (Fotopoulou et al., 2011; 
Jenkinson, Haggard, Ferreira, & Fotopoulou, 2013). Moreover, certain types of 
“mirror therapy” can reduce negative feelings towards the body in eating disorder 
patients (Jansen et al., 2015), and can change the body experience and alleviate pain 
in amputee and neurological patients (Rosén & Lundborg, 2005). 
Outside the clinic, recent experimental studies have suggested that even healthy 
individuals can encounter strange experiences when looking in a mirror. During the 
“strange face illusion” it has been reported that participants who view their face in a 
mirror at low illumination for several minutes describe experiences that their 
reflection changes and distorts; for example, appearing deformed, like another person, 
or like another being/animal (Caputo, 2010, 2013a; Caputo et al., 2012; see also 
Schwarz & Fjeld, 1968 for an earlier investigation of the phenomenon). It is 
surprising that healthy participants can experience strong visual illusions after only a 
few minutes of normal mirror viewing, given that this is an everyday activity. Thus, it 
is possible that demand characteristics play a role in these reported strange face 
illusions, particularly as the illusion is yet to stand up to full scientific rigor, with the 
few experiments so far reporting the phenomenon having a small sample size and not 
being fully controlled (Caputo, 2010, 2013a).  Less surprising, however, is the finding 
that these strange illusory experiences are found to be stronger in individuals 
suffering from schizophrenia (Caputo et al., 2012) and it is thought that they are 
related to experiences of body dysmorphia and difficulty with self/other distinctions. 
Indeed, schizophrenia as well as schizotypal traits are thought to be related to deficits 
in self-face recognition (Irani et al., 2006; Platek & Gallup, 2002) and body/action 
perception (Louzolo, Kalckert, & Petrovic, 2015; Thakkar, Nichols, McIntosh, & 
Park, 2011), which seems compatible with the experiences of strange face illusions. 
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For many conditions in which self and body perception is impaired these experiences 
focus predominantly on the body rather than the face, yet, to date, whether perceptual 
illusions can occur when viewing our body rather than our face in the mirror has not 
been investigated. Moreover, investigating the body also allows for more rigorous 
experimental control; you can view your own body both directly and via a mirror, 
whereas viewing your own face is only possible via a mirror, or other reflective 
surface. Therefore, with face illusions it is difficult to determine whether any reported 
illusory experiences reveal something special about seeing ourselves in a mirror, or 
are simply due to viewing our own face.
It is widely thought that faces are special and not just another part of the body, 
both in terms of behavioural and neural processing (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 
1997; McKone, Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007; Schwarzlose, 2005). However, some 
suggest that our specialism for processing faces is purely due to familiarity and 
expertise (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; 
Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). In addition, mirror self-
recognition studies in infants find no difference in accuracy of self-recognition for the 
face and other body parts (Nielsen et al., 2016). Furthermore, multisensory perceptual 
illusions originally applied to body parts (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) or whole bodies 
(Maselli & Slater, 2013; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; Preston & Ehrsson, 2014), have 
now also be adapted, at least to some degree, to the face (Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, 
Coleman, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tajadura-Jiménez, Lorusso, & Tsakiris, 2013; Tsakiris, 
2008). These illusions use principles of multisensory integration to create an illusory 
experience of embodiment/ownership over a different body/body part or someone 
else’s face. 
Page 6 of 36
A notable difference between these multisensory face and body illusions is that 
the subjective illusion strength appears to be greatly reduced for the face compared to 
the body or body parts (e.g. compare Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tajadura-Jiménez et 
al., 2012). For illusions involving the body, participants tend to explicitly agree that 
they feel like the new body/limb belongs to them, whereas they deny ownership in 
control conditions. This effect occurs even with a body/body part that is noticeably 
different from their own in terms of, for example, size, race and even gender (Farmer, 
Tajadura-Jiménez, & Tsakiris, 2012; Kilteni, Normand, Sanchez-Vives, & Slater, 
2012; Normand, Giannopoulos, Spanlang, & Slater, 2011; Preston & Ehrsson, 2014; 
Preston & Newport, 2012; van der Hoort, Guterstam, & Ehrsson, 2011). For the face 
illusions, however, although they result in an increase in judgements of ownership 
compared to control conditions, participants’ responses generally reflect uncertainty 
or a neutral response, rather than strong affirmation of the illusion (Ma, Sellaro, 
Lippelt, & Hommel, 2016; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012). Synchronous touch of the 
own and someone else’s face seems to blur distinctions between self and other 
representations. Thus, this “enfacement effect” appears to shift the boundaries of self-
recognition as opposed to replacing the actual representation with that of another, as 
may happen in the rubber hand and other multisensory body (non-face) illusions. This 
may suggest that our subjective perceptual representation of our own face is relatively 
rigid, whereas our perceptual experience of the body is more flexible, and as such, 
may be more prone to perceptual distortions during mirror gazing.
However, studies investigating the effect of mirror viewing on these 
multisensory body illusions find equivalent results in the mirror compared with direct 
view (Bertamini, Berselli, Bode, Lawson, & Wong, 2011; Jenkinson & Preston, 2015; 
Preston, Kuper-Smith, & Ehrsson, 2015) and as such, have suggested that mirror view 
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is no different from a direct ‘first person’ perspective (Preston et al., 2015). This line 
of argument may therefore suggest that viewing the body in a mirror is essentially the 
same as viewing the body directly (at least in an explicit or subjective sense), and so 
be less prone to visual illusions arising simply from prolonged self-observation in a 
mirror. Viewing our face, on the other hand, cannot be done directly and as such is a 
relatively more unusual (albeit still frequent) behaviour, in which case we might 
expect that illusions experienced whilst viewing our face in the mirror may not be 
present to the same extent for the body.
The aim of this study was to explore the structure of experience during self-
observation of the body in a mirror, using a psychometric approach. We were 
particularly interested in exploring whether seeing the body in a mirror would result 
in a subjective experience that was equivalent to seeing the body directly (see 
Bertamini et al., 2011; Jenkinson & Preston, 2015; Preston et al., 2015), or if mirror 
observation  would produce strange perceptual experiences, like those reported during 
prolonged self-viewing of the face (Caputo, 2010, 2013a; Caputo et al., 2012; 
Schwarz & Fjeld, 1968). Additionally, we explored whether these experiences related 
to pre-existing tendencies to: (i) have anxiety about ones appearance (appearance 
anxiety),  (ii) posses body dysmorphic-type motivations for using mirrors, (iii) have 
unusual dissociative experiences (e.g. dissociative symptomatology), (iv) objectify the 
body, and (v) generally hold unusual (delusional) beliefs (i.e. delusion ideation). In 
our study participants looked at their body continuously, either directly or in a mirror, 
for a period of five minutes, and then rated 20 statements describing their subjective 
experiences. We subsequently used Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to explore 
the structure underlying the experience, and examined the relationship between the 
extracted components and the aforementioned individual characteristics.
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2. Method
2.1. Participants
One hundred and twenty four naïve healthy volunteers participated in the 
research (21 men; 103 women; mean age = 20.521, SD = 3.70). All participants self-
reported not having a history of neurological or psychiatric illness, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and gave fully-informed, written consent. The study was 
approved by an institutional research ethics committee.
2.2. Design and Materials
A repeated measures design was used to compare subjective experiences of (1) 
direct and (2) mirror views of the body, using a Body Experience Questionnaire 
(BEQ; see 2.2.1). We also measured: (i) appearance anxiety (see 2.2.2), (ii) 
motivations for mirror gazing (2.2.3) (iii) dissociative symptomatology (2.2.4), (iv) 
self objectification (2.2.5), and (v) delusion ideation (see 2.2.6) in order to examine 
how these variables might relate to experiences of the body.
2.2.1. Body Experience Questionnaire (BEQ). We designed a 20-item 
questionnaire based on previous research into embodiment (Longo, Schüür, Kammers, 
Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008) and experiences elicited from self-observation during the 
Strange-Face-Illusion (Caputo, 2010, 2013a; Caputo et al., 2012; Schwarz & Fjeld, 
1968). The items were designed to quantify a wide range of both normal and unusual 
subjective experiences during self-observation of the body. The items covered a wide 
range of themes that participants might experience, including (four from each of the 
following categories): loss of self, change and deformation, affect, embodiment and 
awareness, and general suggestibility to strange or unusual experiences (see Table S1 
in Supplementary Materials). Participants indicated their level of agreement with each 
statement using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 
(strongly agree).
2.2.2. Appearance Anxiety Inventory (AAI; Veale et al., 2014). The AAI is a 
self-report measure of appearance anxiety, focusing on the cognitive processes and 
1 Age data for two participants were missing for calculation of mean & SD.
Page 9 of 36
behaviours that are characteristic of a distorted body image (typically found in body 
dysmorphic disorder). The scale comprises 10 items scored on a 5-point Likert scale 
(0 = not at all; 4 = all the time; range = 0 to 40). A total score is obtained by summing 
all items, with higher scores therefore reflect greater frequency of appearance anxiety 
processes. Psychometric properties of the AAI are reported in (Veale et al., 2014).
2.2.3. Mirror Gazing Questionnaire (MGQ; Veale & Riley, 2001). The MGQ 
was developed to measure motivations that people with body dysmorphic disorder 
have for looking in a mirror. Participants rate the strength of agreement (1 = strongly 
disagree; 5 = strongly agree) with 12 statements that refer to beliefs individuals might 
hold before looking in a mirror (e.g. “I have to know for certain how I appear in 
public”; “I look in the mirror to see how I feel”; and “If I resist looking in the mirror 
then I will feel worse”). None of the items are reversed. We therefore calculated a 
total score by summing the score of each item (min = 12, max = 60), with higher 
scores indicating greater body-dysmorphic-type motivations for mirror gazing.
2.2.4. Clinician Administered Dissociative State Scale (CADSS; Bremner et 
al., 1998). The CADSS provides a standardised measure of present-state dissociative 
symptomatology. The CADSS comprises 27 items, with 19 subject-rated items and 8 
scored by an observer. Only the 19 subject-rated items were used in this study to 
measure dissociative states. Each item is rated on a 5-point scale (0 = not at all, 1 = 
slightly, 2 = moderately, 3 = considerably, 4 = extremely). A total CADSS score is 
calculated by summing the individual items (range = 0 to 76). Reliability and validity 
of the CADSS have been examined and reported in Bremner et al. (1998).
2.2.5. Self Objectification Questionnaire (SOQ; Noll & Fredrickson, 1998). 
The SOQ measures trait self-objectification (i.e. the extent to which people self-
objectify or appreciate their bodies more from a third-person perspective than from a 
first-person perspective; (Noll & Fredrickson, 1998). The questionnaire comprises 10 
statements that relate to appearance-based and competence based attributes of the 
body, which participants rank in terms of the impact each has on their physical self-
concept (0 = least impact, 9 = greatest impact; score range = -25 to 25). Higher scores 
indicate a greater emphasis on appearance and higher trait self-objectification. 
Importantly, the questionnaire does not examine body satisfaction; but only concern 
with appearance without a judgmental or evaluative component.
2.2.6. Peters Delusion Inventory-21 (PDI-21; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 
2004). The PDI-21 measures delusion ideation in the general population. It comprises 
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21 items, to which participants first provide a yes/no response to indicate the presence 
(scored 1) or absence (scored 0) of a given delusional belief, and subsequently (for 
endorsed items only) ratings are provided for: (i) distress (1 = not at all distressing, 5 
= very distressing), (ii) preoccupation (1 = hardly ever think about it, 5 = think about 
it all the time), and (iii) conviction (1 = Don’t believe it’s true, 5 = Believe it is 
absolutely true). Four separate scores can thus be obtained: a PDI yes/no score (range 
0-21), and scores for distress, preoccupation and conviction (each ranging from 0-
105). A grand total PDI score can be obtained by summing all four components 
(range 0-336) to provide a global measure of delusion ideation. Psychometric 
properties of the PDI-21 have been examined and reported in Peters et al., (2004).
2.3. Apparatus and Procedure
Participants completed all questionnaires via an online survey prior to attending a 
face-to-face experimental testing session (minimum 24 hours later). The experimental 
testing session took place in a large (~3m x 5m) testing room (psychology laboratory) 
illuminated by only a 40w frosted halogen lamp (no lamp shade), which was 
positioned on a small (~0.5m high) table located 1m behind and to the right of the 
participant, where it could not be seen directly (see Figure 1). This set-up created a 
dim, diffused illumination in the room.
Participants wore their own clothes during the procedure and were not 
forewarned about the prolonged mirror observation or given any clothing 
requirements beforehand so that a more naturalistic experience of body self-
observation could be obtained. However, upon arrival at the lab participants removed 
any outdoor or bulky items of clothing that covered their body (overcoats, jackets, 
hoodies, hats, gloves, scarves, etc.). The experiment involved two conditions, the 
order of which was counterbalanced across participants. During the mirror self-
observation condition participants stood at a distance of 1m in front of a full-length 
(1.6m x 0.4m) mirror, and were instructed to observe their body continuously for a 5-
minute period via the mirror. Participants were instructed to look at their body only 
via the mirror and to not look directly (down) at their body. Participants were free to 
look at any part of their body for as long as they wished, but were told to continue 
looking at their body for the full 5-minute duration and avoid distraction (i.e. turn off 
their phone and not look around the room or close their eyes). The top of the mirror 
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was covered with a black cloth to prevent vision of the face, whilst allowing a full and 
unobstructed view of the body (checked prior to commencing the condition).
The direct self-observation condition followed the same general instructions, but 
with participants instructed to look down and observe their body directly and 
continuously for a 5-minute period. During this condition the mirror was covered 
completely with the black cloth. The experimenter timed each 5-minute period and 
remained in the room throughout (sitting out of sight of the participant) to ensure 
compliance with instructions (and giving reminders if necessary).
2.4. Statistical Analyses
Descriptive statistics were calculated for each item on the BEQ following direct 
and mirror feedback separately (see Figure 2). Likewise, scores for the AAI, MGQ, 
CADSS, SOQ, and PDI-21 were calculated as specified above. Principal Components 
Analyses (PCA) with varimax rotation was then used to investigate the structure 
underlying direct and mirror self-observation of the body, using scores from the BEQ. 
Separate PCAs were conducted for the direct and mirror conditions. To compare the 
similarity of the resulting components during direct and mirror conditions we then 
carried out a Procrustes rotation on the mirror component loading matrix to fit the 
direct component matrix, followed by calculation of Tucker’s congruence coefficient 
(see Burt, 1948; Lorenzo-Seva & ten Berge, 2006; Tucker, 1951). To examine the 
relationship between experiences of the body and other psychological traits, scores 
from the AAI, MGQ, CADSS, SOQ and PDI-21 were subsequently correlated with 
component scores obtained from the BEQ PCA.
In addition to the above main analyses, we also used Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA) to explore differences in responses to each of the 20 BEQ 
items during direct and mirror views. This analysis identified significant differences 
between direct and mirror view for only two items (Q4 & 12), both of which were not 
generally agreed with by participants (see Figure 2, below). For brevity, full details of 
this analysis are reported in the Supplementary Materials.
3. Results
Figure 2 summarises the descriptive statistics for the BEQ items. Summary 
statistics for the AAI, MGQ, CADSS, SOQ and PDI-21 are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Mean and standard deviation of AAI, MGQ, CADSS, SOQ and PDI-21
Mean SD
AAI (min = 0, max = 40) 13.00 7.45
MGQ (min =  12, max = 60) 36.72 8.26
CADDS (min = 0, max = 76) 9.85 10.72
SOQ (min = -25, max = 25) 1.61 13.78
PDI-21
Yes/No (min = 0, max = 21) 5.22 3.41
Distress (min = 0, max = 105) 14.71 11.09
Preoccupation (min = 0, max = 105) 15.90 11.62
Conviction (min = 0, max = 105) 17.36 12.27
Total (min = 0, max = 336) 53.83 37.36
Note: online data could not be matched to the experimental session data in 12 cases; 
therefore N = 112 for all statistics reported in this table. AAI = Appearance Anxiety 
Inventory; MGQ = Mirror Gazing Questionnaire; CADSS = Clinician Administered 
Dissociative State Scale; SOQ = Self Objectification Questionnaire; PDI-21 = Peters 
Delusion Inventory-21.
3.1. Direct Body Self-Observation PCA
The Kayser-Meyer-Olkin measure (Kaiser, 1974; KMO = .86), Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity (Bartlett, 1954; p <.001), and presence of many coefficients above .3 in the 
correlation matrix, indicated the adequacy of performing a PCA with the BEQ data. 
For direct view of the body, examination of the scree plot, eigenvalues, and Horn’s 
Parallel Factor Analysis (Horn, 1965; based on corresponding criterion values for a 
randomly generated data matrix of the same size: 20 variables x 124 respondents with 
100 replications; implemented using Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis; Watkins, 
2005) were used to determine the number of components extracted. This led to the 
extraction of a two-component structure, which together accounted for 50.22% of the 
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overall variance in the data (see Table 2). To aid interpretation and ensure a solid 
structure, only those items that loaded strongly (i.e. .50 or better; see Costello & 
Osborne, 2005) onto a given component were used for interpretation. Component one 
accounted for 37.99 % of the variance, with several items loading substantially (.80 or 
higher) on only this component, including items 3 (I was disgusted with my body) and 
16 (I was uncomfortable with my body), and negative loadings (-.80 or higher) for 
items 11 (I was satisfied with my body) and 20 (I was happy with my body). Other 
items loading only on this component related to the body being different (item 14), 
uncomfortable (item 16) and fatter than usual (item 13). We therefore termed this 
component body evaluations. The second component accounted for 12.23% of the 
variance, with strong items loading only on this component describing changes to 
physical characteristics of the body (item 8: my clothes changed; item 5: my body 
changed shape), and strange or unusual experiences (item 7: I felt two dimensional; 
item 15: my body seemed like a stranger; item 17: it seemed like I had an extra limb; 
item 4: my body seemed to disappear). We termed this component unusual feelings 
and perceptions.
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Table 2. Component loadings from PCA with varimax rotation of direct (dark grey columns) and mirror view (light grey columns) BEQ item 
responses.
Item “During the procedure there were 
times when…”
Direct 
condition
Mirror 
condition
Component 1 Component 2 Communalities Component 1 Component 2 Communalities
1. …my body seemed strange .571 .515 .592 .650 .505
2. …it seemed like the body I saw 
belonged to me
.383 -.502 .468
3. …I was disgusted with my body .879 .811 .876 .782
4. …my body seemed to disappear .604 .373 .674 .512
5. …my body changed shape .632 .548 .454
6. …my body seemed deformed .542 .549 .595 .711 .596
7. …I felt two dimensional .688 .511 .608 .385
8. …my clothes changed .725 .525 .747 .566
9. …my body seemed vivid .101 .134
10. …it seemed like I was looking at 
myself
.312 -.651 .608
11. …I was satisfied with my body -854 .754 -.879 .777
12. …the body I saw looked upside 
down
.212 .533 .293
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13. …my body seemed fatter than usual .702 .521 .725 .533
14. …my body was different than 
expected
.606 .565 .628 .567
15. …my body seemed like a stranger .686 .679 .543 .572 .622
16. …I was uncomfortable with my body .859 .766 .864 .753
17. …it seemed like I had an extra limb .682 .491 .625 .471
18. …my body seemed thinner than 
usual
.368 .272
19. …I was very aware of my bodily 
sensations
.117 .004
20. …I was happy with my body -.893 .819 -.862 .754
Eigenvalues 7.597 2.446 7.793 2.239
Random Eigenvalue (from Parallel 
Analysis)
1.800 1.634 1.806 1.654
Percentage variance explained 37.986 12.229 38.966 11.194
Note: Component loadings less than 0.5 are not displayed.
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3.2. Mirror Body Self-Observation PCA 
The adequacy of the mirror BEQ data was again established (KMO = .87; 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity, p < .001) and, applying the same criteria as for the direct 
view PCA, a similar two-component structure was extracted, explaining 50.16% of 
the total variance (see Table 2). Component one explained 38.97% of the total 
variance, and component two 11.19%. The main differences between the direct and 
mirror view PCA were the addition of items 1 (my body seemed strange) and 6 (my 
body seemed deformed), both of which previously loaded onto both components one 
and two, but now strongly loaded only onto component one. In addition, item 10 (it 
seemed like I was looking at myself), which did not previously load onto either 
component, now had a strong negative loading onto component one, while item 15 
(my body seemed like a stranger) now loaded onto component one and two, despite 
having previously loaded only onto component two. The theme of these additional 
items appeared to reflect a dissociation or alienation from the observed body, we 
therefore termed component one of the mirror view PCA body evaluations and 
alienation. Component two maintained most of the same items as for the direct PCA, 
but (in addition to the changes in shared items described above) there was the addition 
of item 12 (the body I saw looked upside down), which previously did not load onto 
either component, and item 2 (it seemed like the body I saw belonged to me) now had 
a strong negative loading onto this component. In addition, items 5 (my body changed 
shape) and 6 (my body seemed deformed), no longer loaded onto component two. 
Taking into account these changes, the overall theme of this component continued to 
reflect unusual feelings or perceptual experiences; therefore, we maintained this 
component as before (i.e. terming it unusual feelings and perceptions).
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3.3. Secondary PCAs on Body Evaluations (and Alienation). Because the body 
evaluations (and alienation) component of the above PCAs accounted for a large 
proportion of variance in each condition, we performed a follow-up analysis to 
explore whether a further structure that had been masked in our top-level PCA 
might exist within this component (see Longo et al., 2004; Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson & Tatham, 2006; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Following the method 
of Longo et al., (2004), we performed this PCA for direct and mirror view 
separately using only items that loaded strongly (>.50) onto component one in 
both of the previous analyses (i.e. items 1, 3, 6, 11, 13, 14, 16 & 20). The 
outcome of this analysis confirmed each of the original, single components, but 
did not identify any further sub-components (i.e. both direct and mirror PCA 
extracted only one component).
3.4. Statistical comparison of direct and mirror components. To compare the 
similarity between direct and mirror component interpretations we carried out a 
Procrustes rotation to transform the mirror component matrix loadings to fit the 
direct component matrix (Burt, 1948), and then calculated the congruency 
coefficient (Tucker’s Phi; Tucker, 1951) between direct and mirror conditions for 
each component (see Wuensch, 2016 for the SPSS syntax used to conduct this 
procedure).  The results showed a φ = .99 between direct and mirror conditions 
for component one, and φ = .97 for component two, indicating that the two 
components have good similarity such that direct and mirror conditions can be 
considered equal (Lorenzo-Seva & ten Berge, 2006).
3.5. Relationship between experiences of the observed body and other measures.
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Finally, we investigated whether the above components related to measures of 
appearance anxiety (AAI), body dysmorphic-type mirror gazing beliefs (MGQ), 
dissociative symptomatology (CADSS), self-objectification (SOQ), and delusion 
ideation (PDI-21). Preliminary checks indicated that the data were non-normally 
distributed (Shapiro-Wilk tests, p < .001) for all measures except the MEQ (p = .312); 
therefore, we used Spearman’s correlations and applied a False Discovery Rate 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) corrected significance level (q*) of 0.031 to control 
for multiple testing. and the component scores obtained from each of the top-level 
PCAs (see Table 3 for summary results; scatter plots of these correlations can be 
found in Supplementary Materials).
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Table 3. Correlations between BEQ component scores and AAI, MGQ, CADSS, and PDI-21.
BEQ1
Direct Mirror
Component One Component Two Component One Component Two
AAI rs = .423, p < .001* rs = .119, p = .219 rs = .510, p < .001* rs = .153, p = .113
MGQ rs = .408, p < .001* rs = .231, p = .016* rs = .466, p < .001* rs = .293, p = .002*
CADSS rs =.132, p = .174 rs = .428, p < .001* rs = .154, p = .110 rs = .470, p < .001*
SOQ rs =-.111, p = .253 rs = -.015, p = .874 rs = -.017, p = .863 rs = .046, p = .635
PDI-21
Yes/No rs = .065, p = .507 rs = .440, p < .001* rs = .190, p = .048 rs = .388, p < .001*
Distress rs = .169, p = .08 rs = .387, p < .001* rs = .289, p = .002* rs = .299, p = .002*
Preoccupation rs =.115, p = .234 rs = .405, p < .001* rs = .225, p = .018* rs = .378, p < .001*
Conviction rs = .106, p = .276 rs = .372, p < .001* rs = .229, p = .016* rs = .326, p = .001*
Total rs = .121, p = .213 rs = .400, p < .001* rs = .242, p = .011* rs = .348, p < .001*
Notes: 1component scores cannot be calculated when data are missing; therefore N = 108 for all direct PCA results and 109 for all mirror PCA 
results. AAI = Appearance Anxiety Inventory; MGQ = Mirror Gazing Questionnaire; CADSS = Clinician Administered Dissociative State 
Scale; SOQ = Self Objectification Questionnaire; PDI-21 = Peters Delusion Inventory-21. Component 1 = Body Evaluations; Component 2 = 
Unusual feelings and Perceptions. *significant correlation applying FDR corrected significance level of q* < .031
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3.5.1. Direct self-observation of the body. We found that body evaluations 
(i.e. component one) following direct observation of the body correlated significantly 
with appearance anxiety and body dysmorphic-type mirror gazing beliefs. The size of 
both effects was moderate to strong (Cohen, 1988, 1992), with higher appearance 
anxiety and body dysmorphic-type beliefs being related to increased body evaluations. 
No other correlations with component one were significant. By contrast, unusual 
feelings and perceptions (i.e. component two) did not correlate with appearance 
anxiety or self-objectification, but showed significant medium correlations with body 
dysmorphic-type mirror gazing beliefs, dissociative symptomatology, and all 
measures of delusion ideation (i.e. all PDI-21 scores; see Table 3). Hence, greater 
unusual feelings and perceptions of the directly-observed body were experienced in 
those with greater body dysmorphic-type beliefs, dissociative symptomatology and 
delusional ideation.
3.5.2. Mirror self-observation of the body. Following self-observation of the 
body in a mirror, body evaluations and alienation (i.e. component one) again 
correlated strongly with appearance anxiety and body dysmorphic-type beliefs, and 
also (moderately) with delusion ideation (all PDI-21 scores except Yes/No scores), 
but not dissociative symptomatology or self-objectification. Finally, unusual feelings 
and perceptions (i.e. component two) correlated moderately with all measures (body 
dysmorphic-type beliefs, dissociative symptomatology, and delusion ideation), except 
appearance anxiety and self-objectification.
4. Discussion
Our study used a psychometric approach to explore the subjective experience of 
the body observed directly and in a mirror. In so doing we examined whether illusory 
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experiences reported during prolonged observation of the face (i.e. the strange face 
illusion) also occur for the body. In addition, we examined how several pre-existing 
tendencies (i.e. appearance anxiety, body dysmorphic-type mirror gazing beliefs, 
dissociative symptomatology, self-objectification, and delusion ideation) might 
influence experiences of the body. Our results indicate a two-component structure to 
experiencing the body, which is consistent across conditions of direct and mirror self-
observation. The first and largest component of self-observation relates to an affective 
evaluation of the body, while a smaller, second component involves unusual 
experiences arising during self-observation. Overall the results highlight an 
overarching similarity between experiencing the body directly and in a mirror.
Our findings suggest that under normal circumstances viewing our own body in a 
mirror may be functionally equivalent to seeing a direct, ‘first person’ view of our 
body, despite the obvious physical differences in visual feedback. That is, when we 
look in a mirror and view our specular body as an object seen “from the outside”, this 
image is deemed a part of the self, and analogous to the body we habitually see from a 
first-person perspective. Humans seem to possess an implicit knowledge about the 
reflective properties of mirrors, such that what we see in a mirror is automatically 
transformed and translated back to the space in front of the mirror (Preston et al., 
2015). This process develops in early infancy allowing for self-recognition in a mirror, 
as demonstrated when an infant can use a mirror reflection to notice a mark on the 
face or body – seeing the mark on the body in the mirror is interpreted as the mark 
being located on the actual body (Anderson, 1984). Thus, we receive and synthesise 
information about the body from different sources and perspectives, and integrate 
these to construct a stable sense of embodied self (Jenkinson et al., 2013). The current 
findings are largely in line with this view, as the same two components were found in 
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the PCA for both direct and mirror conditions, suggesting that there is little difference 
in terms of subjective experience when viewing the body in the mirror and when 
viewing the body directly. This conclusion is supported by the high Tucker’s 
congruence coefficient, and the additional MANOVA reported in supplementary 
materials, which found significant differences between direct and mirror view for 
only 2 of the 20 items. 
We did, however, find that for the mirror condition, the component involving 
negative feelings towards the body also incorporated questionnaire items relating to 
alienation that were not present for the direct view. The highest loading factors for 
this component remained consistent between the two conditions, and even alienation 
items that did load following mirror viewing were generally not agreed with in the 
questionnaire. Therefore, although these alienation items contributed to this 
component for the mirror and not direct view condition, on average participants did 
not report explicitly experiencing alienation in either instance. More generally, 
although ratings to several of the BEQ items were negative, this does not indicate an 
absence of experience, but rather a disagreement with positively worded items. 
Overall, the pattern of responses indicate that looking at the body, in a mirror or 
directly, is a highly evaluative and not perceptually neutral experience.
Interestingly, both direct and mirror views of the body involved a component 
relating to unusual feelings and perceptual experiences; however, this component 
accounted for only a minority of the explained variance in both direct and mirror 
conditions. On average participants denied experiencing any type of unusual 
perceptual experience in either condition, although as one might expect, such 
experiences were positively correlated with greater body dysmorphic-type 
motivations for mirror gazing, dissociative symptomatology, and delusion ideation. 
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This general lack of agreement with the BEQ questionnaire items suggests that, 
despite being a component of experience during self-observation, perceptual illusions 
reported whilst viewing the face in the mirror are not present when viewing the rest of 
the body. 
The absence of a “strange body illusion” when viewing the body in a mirror is 
compatible with a dissociation between face and body processing. Interestingly, 
whereas other multisensory perceptual body illusions seem to elicit, on average, 
higher subjective ratings of ownership for the body (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008) compared to the face (Ainley, Tajadura-Jiménez, 
Fotopoulou, & Tsakiris, 2012; Ma et al., 2016; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012), 
illusory mirror-based perceptual experiences, based purely on prolonged visual 
feedback, seem to occur only when viewing the face (Caputo, 2010, 2013a; Caputo et 
al., 2012; Schwarz & Fjeld, 1968) and not the body. However, neither such illusory 
experiences have yet been examined within the same participants for the face and 
body, so direct comparisons cannot be made. Additionally, because it is not possible 
to view one’s own face directly (i.e. from a first-person perspective), it is unclear 
whether it is the third-person view of the face (provided by a mirror or video) that 
creates the unusual perceptual experiences in the strange face illusion, or simply 
viewing one’s own face. Indeed strange-face-illusion-type experiences have been 
reported when participants are staring at the face of another person (Caputo, 2013b, 
2015), which may indicate that it is not the mirror, but the face that is important for 
these face-based illusions. However, with a lack of an adequate control condition, and 
generally low sample sizes, it is difficult to interpret these reports of mirror and inter-
personal strange-face illusions. Future studies should try to verify the strange face 
illusion in larger samples, compare face and body viewing in the same participants, 
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and investigate how mirror view of the self differs from viewing the self in a 
photograph or video for the face as well as the body.
As mentioned above, body dysmorphic-type mirror-gazing beliefs, dissociative 
traits, and delusion ideation were all found to correlate with unusual feelings and 
perceptions, both when viewing the body directly and viewing the body in the mirror. 
This does suggest that unusual perceptual experiences relate to these traits, but not 
specifically from looking in a mirror. Those suffering from body dysmorphic disorder 
are found to engage in frequent mirror gazing (Veale & Riley, 2001), and treatment 
with Cognitive Behavioural Therapy reduces mirror checking behaviours  (Neziroglu, 
McKay, Todaro & Yaryura-Tobias, 1996), but this does not necessarily mean that 
mirror viewing contributes to the pathology. Our results imply that body dysmorphic 
beliefs relate to greater unusual perceptions per se, and not just when looking in a 
mirror. In support of this view, previous studies have also found body dysmorphic 
beliefs to relate to unusual perceptions when viewing the face of another person 
(Caputo, 2013b, 2015). Individual differences in delusion ideation were also found to 
relate to reported unusual perceptual experiences in both conditions. Schizophrenic 
patients are found to have stronger experiences of the strange face illusion compared 
to healthy controls (Caputo et al., 2012). Individuals suffering from schizophrenia are 
also found to have deficits in self recognition (Irani et al., 2006; Platek & Gallup, 
2002) and body/action awareness (Louzolo et al., 2015; Thakkar et al., 2011), but 
these unusual experiences are also not confined to mirror viewing, such that, similar 
to dysmorphic traits, delusions and schizophrenic/delusion symptoms may be related 
to usual experiences, but not specifically when looking in a mirror. 
The other, major component identified by the PCA related to negative 
evaluations of the body. Again, this component was not specific to mirror viewing, 
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but was present for both direct and mirror conditions. Unsurprisingly, greater negative 
experiences were related to greater appearance anxiety and body dysmorphic-type 
motivations for mirror gazing, but this was found for both mirror and non-mirror 
conditions. Indeed, mirrors can actually help treat body image disturbances and 
associated mirror avoidance behaviours. Therapies involving mirror viewing can 
improve body satisfaction in people with body image disturbances that may lead to 
eating disorders (Delinsky & Wilson, 2006), and can also reduce anxiety and increase 
body satisfaction in obese adolescents (Jansen et al., 2008). Moreover, although 
improvements have typically been reported following guided mirror exposure, during 
which a therapist encourages non-evaluative, neutral descriptions of the body, even 
‘pure’ mirror exposure without any guidance has been found to improve body 
satisfaction in a non-clinical, female sample (Moreno-Domínguez, Rodríguez-Ruiz, 
Fernández-Santaella, Jansen, & Tuschen-Caffier, 2012). However, this later study did 
not examine the effect of such ‘pure’ exposure in individuals with eating disorders or 
body image disturbance, and further research is needed to establish more clearly the 
effect of pure mirror exposure on body satisfaction in individuals with different body 
image disturbances or eating disorders.
One notable difference between the mirror and direct views can be seen in the 
relationship between delusion ideation (PDI-21) and body evaluations (component 1), 
which are present after mirror, but not direct observation of the body. These 
correlations suggest that people with greater delusion ideation are prone to evaluate 
their body more when it is seen in a mirror. We also found a correlation between 
dissociative symptomology and unusual feelings and perceptions about the body 
(component 2), although this was during both direct and mirror view, which may 
indicate that dissociative states are linked to a more labile, or unstable bodily self. 
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Indeed, recent research indicates that the rubber hand illusion is enhanced in patients 
with delusions and dissociation-associated changes in body-perception such as 
schizophrenia (Peled, Ritsner, Hirschmann, Gena & Modai, 2000) and borderline 
personality disorder (Bekrater-Bodmann, Chung, Foell, Gescher, Bohus, & Flor, 
2016), and healthy individuals given ketamine (Morgan et al., 2011), which is known 
to reproduce the symptoms of schizophrenia. Our ideas are speculative and based only 
on correlations in healthy individuals; however, they open up the opportunity for 
future research to confirm and explore these ideas further.
In sum, using a psychometric approach we found that the body observed in a 
mirror is treated as equivalent to the body observed directly. Contrary to similar 
investigations involving prolonged observation of the face, simply viewing the body 
in a mirror does not lead to unusual, illusory experiences. Further research is needed 
to directly compare the occurrence of face and body illusions in the same participants, 
and examine the effect of pure mirror feedback on negative body-related feelings in 
people with body image disturbances and/or eating disorders.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The experimental setup (a) with example of direct (b) and mirror (c) views 
of the body.
Figure 2. Mean (SE) responses to BEQ items. Adjacent bars of the same colour 
represent responses for the direct (left/stippled colour) and mirror (right/solid colour) 
views. See Table 2 for item labels (Q1-20)
Page 29 of 36
References
Ainley, V., Tajadura-Jiménez, A., Fotopoulou, A., & Tsakiris, M. (2012). Looking 
into myself: changes in interoceptive sensitivity during mirror self-observation. 
Psychophysiology, 49(11), 1504–8. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2012.01468.x
Amsterdam, B. (1972). Mirror Self-Image Reactions Before Age Two. Developmental 
Psychobiology, 305(4), 297–305.
Anderson, J. R. (1984). The Development of Self-Recognition : A Review. 
Developmental Psychobiology, 17(1), 35–49.
Bertamini, M., Berselli, N., Bode, C., Lawson, R., & Wong, L. T. (2011). The rubber 
hand illusion in a mirror. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1108–19. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.04.006
Bertamini, M., Latto, R., & Spooner, A. (2003). The Venus effect : people’s 
understanding of mirror reflections in paintings. Perception, 32, 593–599. 
http://doi.org/10.1068/p3418
Bertamini, M., Lawson, R., Jones, L., & Winters, M. (2010). The Venus effect in real 
life and in photographs. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72(7), 1948–
1964. http://doi.org/10.3758/APP.72.7.1948
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands “feel” touch that eyes see. Nature, 
391(6669), 756. http://doi.org/10.1038/35784
Bremner, J. D., Krystal, J. H., Putnam, F. W., Southwick, S. M., Marmar, C., Charney, 
D. S., & Mazure, C. M. (1998). Measurement of dissociative states with the 
Clinician-Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS). Journal of 
Traumatic Stress, 11(1), 125–136. http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024465317902
Caputo, G. B. (2010). Strange-face-in-the-mirror illusion. Perception, 39(7), 1007–
Page 30 of 36
1008. http://doi.org/10.1068/p6466
Caputo, G. B. (2013a). Archetypal-Imaging and Mirror-Gazing. Behavioral Sciences, 
4(1), 1–13. http://doi.org/10.3390/bs4010001
Caputo, G. B. (2013b). Strange-face illusions during inter-subjective gazing. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 22(1), 324–329. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.08.007
Caputo, G. B. (2015). Dissociation and hallucinations in dyads engaged through 
interpersonal gazing. Psychiatry Research, 228(3), 659–663. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2015.04.050
Caputo, G. B., Ferrucci, R., Bortolomasi, M., Giacopuzzi, M., Priori, A., & Zago, S. 
(2012). Visual perception during mirror gazing at one’s own face in 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 140(1–3), 46–50. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2012.06.029
Delinsky, S. S., & Wilson, G. T. (2006). Mirror exposure for the treatment of body 
image disturbance. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 39(2), 108–116. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/eat.20207
Diamon, R., & Carey, S. (1986). Why faces are and are not special: an effect of 
expertise. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115(2), 107–117.
Farmer, H., Tajadura-Jiménez, A., & Tsakiris, M. (2012). Beyond the colour of my 
skin: How skin colour affects the sense of body-ownership. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 21(3), 1242–1256. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.04.011
Fotopoulou, A., Jenkinson, P. M., Tsakiris, M., Haggard, P., Rudd, A., & Kopelman, 
M. D. (2011). Mirror-view reverses somatoparaphrenia: dissociation between 
first- and third-person perspectives on body ownership. Neuropsychologia, 
49(14), 3946–55. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.10.011
Page 31 of 36
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J. C., & Anderson, A. W. (2000). Expertise for cars 
and birds recruits brain areas involved in face recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 
3(2), 191–197. http://doi.org/10.1038/72140
Gauthier, I., Tarr, M. J., Anderson, A. W., Skudlarski, P., & Gore, J. C. (1999). 
Activation of the middle fusiform “face area” increases with expertise in 
recognizing novel objects. Nature Neuroscience, 2(6), 568–73. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/9224
Gordon, G. G. J. (1970). Chimpanzees: self recognition.pdf. Science, 167(3914), 86–
87. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.167.3914.86
Irani, F., Platek, S. M., Panyavin, I. S., Calkins, M. E., Kohler, C., Siegel, S. J., … 
Gur, R. C. (2006). Self-face recognition and theory of mind in patients with 
schizophrenia and first-degree relatives. Schizophrenia Research, 88(1–3), 151–
160. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2006.07.016
Jansen, A., Bollen, D., Tuschen-Caffier, B., Roefs, A., Tanghe, A., & Braet, C. (2008). 
Mirror exposure reduces body dissatisfaction and anxiety in obese adolescents: 
A pilot study. Appetite, 51(1), 214–217. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2008.01.011
Jansen, A., Voorwinde, V., Hoebink, Y., Rekkers, M., Martijn, C., & Mulkens, S. 
(2015). Mirror exposure to increase body satisfaction: should we guide the focus 
of attention towards positively or negatively evaluated body parts? Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 50, 90–96. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2015.06.002
Jenkinson, P. M., Haggard, P., Ferreira, N. C., & Fotopoulou, A. (2013). Body 
ownership and attention in the mirror: insights from somatoparaphrenia and the 
rubber hand illusion. Neuropsychologia, 51(8), 1453–62. 
Page 32 of 36
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.03.029
Jenkinson, P. M., & Preston, C. (2015). New reflections on agency and body 
ownership: The moving rubber hand illusion in the mirror. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 33, 432–42. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.02.020
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: a 
module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. The Journal 
of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 17(11), 
4302–11. http://doi.org/10.1098/Rstb.2006.1934
Kilteni, K., Normand, J. M., Sanchez-Vives, M. V., & Slater, M. (2012). Extending 
body space in immersive virtual reality: A very long arm illusion. PLoS ONE, 
7(7). http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040867
Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008). 
What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. Cognition, 107(3), 978–98. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.004
Louzolo, A., Kalckert, A., & Petrovic, P. (2015). When passive feels active - 
Delusion-proneness alters self-recognition in the moving rubber hand illusion. 
PLoS ONE, 10(6), 1–12. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0128549
Ma, K., Sellaro, R., Lippelt, D. P., & Hommel, B. (2016). Mood migration: How 
enfacing a smile makes you happier. Cognition, 151, 52–62. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.02.018
Maselli, A., & Slater, M. (2013). The building blocks of the full body ownership 
illusion. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 83. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00083
McKone, E., Kanwisher, N., & Duchaine, B. C. (2007). Can generic expertise explain 
special processing for faces? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(1), 8–15. 
Page 33 of 36
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.002
Moreno-Domínguez, S., Rodríguez-Ruiz, S., Fernández-Santaella, M. C., Jansen, A., 
& Tuschen-Caffier, B. (2012). Pure versus guided mirror exposure to reduce 
body dissatisfaction: A preliminary study with university women. Body Image, 
9(2), 285–288. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.bodyim.2011.12.001
Nielsen, M., Suddendorf, T., Slaughter, V., Development, C., Nielsen, M., 
Suddendorf, T., & Slaughter, V. (2016). Mirror Self-Recognition beyond the 
Face. Child Development, 77(1), 176–185. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2004.00681.x
Noll, S. M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). A Mediational model linking self-
objectification, body shame, and disordered eating. Psychology of Women 
Quarterly, 22(4), 623–636. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1998.tb00181.x
Normand, J.-M., Giannopoulos, E., Spanlang, B., & Slater, M. (2011). Multisensory 
stimulation can induce an illusion of larger belly size in immersive virtual reality. 
PloS One, 6(1), e16128. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0016128
Peters, E., Joseph, S., Day, S., & Garety, P. (2004). Measuring Delusional Ideation: 
The 21-Item Peters et al. Delusions Inventor...: Joshua. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 
30(4), 1005–1022. http://doi.org/10.1037/t03329-000
Petkova, V. I., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2008). If I were you: perceptual illusion of body 
swapping. PloS One, 3(12), e3832. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0003832
Phillips, M. L. (1996). “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who...?”: Towards a Model of 
Visual Self-recognition. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 1(2), 153–164.
Platek, S. M., & Gallup, G. G. (2002). Self-face recognition is affected by schizotypal 
personality traits. Schizophrenia Research, 57(1), 81–85. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0920-9964(01)00310-3
Page 34 of 36
Plotnik, J. M., de Waal, F. B. M., & Reiss, D. (2006). Self-recognition in an Asian 
elephant. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America, 103(45), 17053–17057. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0608062103
Preston, C., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2014). Illusory changes in body size modulate body 
satisfaction in a way that is related to non-clinical eating disorder 
psychopathology. PloS One, 9(1), e85773. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0085773
Preston, C., Kuper-Smith, B. J., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2015). Owning the body in the 
mirror: The effect of visual perspective and mirror view on the full-body illusion. 
Scientific Reports, 5, 18345. http://doi.org/10.1038/srep18345
Preston, C., & Newport, R. (2012). How long is your arm? Using multisensory 
illusions to modify body image from the third person perspective. Perception, 
41(2), 247–249. http://doi.org/10.1068/p7103
Reiss, D., & Marino, L. (2001). Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: A 
case of cognitive convergence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
98(10), 5937–5942. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.101086398
Rochat, P., & Zahavi, D. (2011). The uncanny mirror: A re-framing of mirror self-
experience. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(2), 204–213. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.06.007
Rosén, B., & Lundborg, G. (2005). Training with a mirror in rehabilitation of the 
hand. Scandinavian Journal of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery and Hand 
Surgery / Nordisk Plastikkirurgisk Forening [and] Nordisk Klubb for 
Handkirurgi, 39(2), 104–8. http://doi.org/10.1080/02844310510006187
Schwarz, L. H., & Fjeld, S. P. (1968). Illusions Induced By the Self-Reflected Image. 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. Retrieved from 
Page 35 of 36
http://ovidsp.ovid.com/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&PAGE=reference&D=psyc2&NEWS
=N&AN=1968-14069-001
Schwarzlose, R. F. (2005). Separate Face and Body Selectivity on the Fusiform Gyrus. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 25(47), 11055–11059. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2621-05.2005
Shafran, R., Fairburn, C. G., Robinson, P., & Lask, B. (2004). Body Checking and its 
Avoidance in Eating Disorders. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 35(1), 
93–101. http://doi.org/10.1002/eat.10228
Tajadura-Jiménez, A., Longo, M. R., Coleman, R., & Tsakiris, M. (2012). The person 
in the mirror: Using the enfacement illusion to investigate the experiential 
structure of self-identification. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(4), 1725–1738. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.10.004
Tajadura-Jiménez, A., Lorusso, L., & Tsakiris, M. (2013). Active and passive-touch 
during interpersonal multisensory stimulation change self-other boundaries. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 22(4), 1352–1360. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.09.002
Thakkar, K. N., Nichols, H. S., McIntosh, L. G., & Park, S. (2011). Disturbances in 
body ownership in schizophrenia: Evidence from the rubber hand illusion and 
case study of a spontaneous out-of-body experience. PLoS ONE, 6(10). 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0027089
Tsakiris, M. (2008). Looking for myself: Current multisensory input alters self-face 
recognition. PLoS ONE, 3(12), 2–7. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004040
van der Hoort, B., Guterstam, A., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2011). Being barbie: The size of 
one’s own body determines the perceived size of the world. PLoS ONE, 6(5), 
e20195. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0020195
Page 36 of 36
Veale, D., Eshkevari, E., Kanakam, N., Ellison, N., Costa, A., & Werner, T. (2014). 
The Appearance Anxiety Inventory: Validation of a Process Measure in the 
Treatment of Body Dysmorphic Disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 42(5), 605–616. http://doi.org/10.1017/S1352465813000556
Veale, D., & Riley, S. (2001). Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the ugliest of them 
all? The psychopathology of mirror gazing in body dysmorphic disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39(12), 1381–1393. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00102-9


Supplementary Materials
S1. Comparison of responses to BEQ items during direct and mirror view.
We conducted an additional, exploratory analysis to determine whether direct and 
mirror view of the body resulted in differences in response to the questionnaire items. 
A 2 (View: Direct vs. Mirror) x 20 (Item: 1-20) repeated-measures MANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Item, F (19, 99) = 64.68, p < .001, and Visual 
Feedback x Item interaction, F (19, 99) = 3.76, p < .001, but no main effect of View, 
F (1, 117) = .004, p = .947. Follow-up paired-samples t-tests comparing the direct and 
mirror view for each item (applying a Bonferroni correction for 20 comparisons; 
alpha = .0025) revealed that the interaction was driven by significant differences 
between direct and mirror view only for items 4 (my body seemed to disappear) and 
12 (the body I saw looked upside down’ see Table S1). Moreover, despite the 
significant difference between direct and mirror views for these two items, neither 
statement had a mean score above zero, indicating that participants generally did not 
agree with these statements (see Figure 1 of main manuscript).
Table S1. Post-hoc comparisons of direct and mirror view for each item on the BEQ.
Item t df P 
1. …my body seemed strange -2.35 123 .020
2. …it seemed like the body I saw belonged to me 2.64 123 .009
3. …I was disgusted with my body -1.47 123 .145
4. …my body seemed to disappear 3.35 123 .001*
5. …my body changed shape -2.34 123 .012
6. …my body seemed deformed -1.05 123 .294
7. …I felt two dimensional -2.20 122 .030
8. …my clothes changed -.39 122 .700
9. …my body seemed vivid -0.65 122 .949
10. …it seemed like I was looking at myself .94 123 .349
11. …I was satisfied with my body 1.52 123 .131
12. …the body I saw looked upside down 5.15 123 <.001*
13. …my body seemed fatter than usual .40 123 .687
14. …my body was different than expected -2.28 121 .024
15. …my body seemed like a stranger -2.02 121 .046
16. …I was uncomfortable with my body -1.28 123 .202
17. …it seemed like I had an extra limb 2.48 121 .015
18. …my body seemed thinner than usual -.40 123 .692
19. …I was very aware of my bodily sensations .06 123 .954
20. …I was happy with my body 1.39 123 .168
* = significant difference between direct and mirror view. Note: Bonferroni corrected 
alpha = .0025
S2. Scatterplots of correlations
S2.1. Correlations with Direct View BEQ Component 1 (negative body evaluations)
Figure S1. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of appearance anxiety (AAI 
score) and Component 1 (negative body evaluations) scores from the direct view PCA.
Figure S2. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of body dysmorphic-type 
beliefs (MGQ score) and Component 1 (negative body evaluations) scores from the 
direct view PCA.
Figure S3. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of dissociative experiences 
(CADSS score) and Component 1 (negative body evaluations) scores from the direct 
view PCA.
Figure S4. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of self objectification (SOQ 
score) and Component 1 (negative body evaluations) scores from the direct view PCA.
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Figure S5. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of (a) delusion ideation 
frequency, (b) overall delusion ideation, (c) delusion ideation distress, (d) 
preoccupation, and (e) conviction and Component 1 (negative body evaluations) 
scores from the direct view PCA.
S2.2. Correlations with Direct View BEQ Component 2 (unusual feelings and 
perceptions)
Figure S6. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of appearance anxiety (AAI 
score) and Component 2 (unusual feelings and perceptions) scores from the direct 
view PCA.
Figure S7. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of body dysmorphic-type 
beliefs (MGQ score) and Component 2 (unusual feelings and perceptions) scores from 
the direct view PCA.
Figure S8. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of dissociative experiences 
(CADSS score) and Component 2 (unusual feelings and perceptions) scores from the 
direct view PCA.
Figure S9. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of self objectification (SOQ 
score) and Component 2 (unusual feelings and perceptions) scores from the direct 
view PCA.
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Figure S10. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of (a) delusion ideation 
frequency, (b) overall delusion ideation, (c) delusion ideation distress, (d) 
preoccupation, and (e) conviction and Component 2 (unusual feelings and 
perceptions) scores from the direct view PCA.
S2.3. Correlations with Mirror view BEQ Component 1 (negative body evaluations 
and alienation)
Figure S11. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of appearance anxiety 
(AAI score) and Component 1 (negative body evaluations and alienation) scores from 
the mirror view PCA.
Figure S12. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of body dysmorphic-type 
beliefs (MGQ score) and Component 1 (negative body evaluations and alienation) 
scores from the mirror view PCA.
Figure S13. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of dissociative experiences 
(CADSS score) and Component 1 (negative body evaluations and alienation) scores 
from the mirror view PCA.
Figure S14. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of self objectification 
(SOQ score) and Component 1 (negative body evaluations and alienation) scores from 
the mirror view PCA.
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Figure S15. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of (a) delusion ideation 
frequency, (b) overall delusion ideation, (c) delusion ideation distress, (d) 
preoccupation, and (e) conviction and Component 1 (negative body evaluations and 
alienation) scores from the mirror view PCA.
S2.4. Correlations with Mirror View BEQ Component 2 (unusual feelings and 
perceptions)
Figure S16. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of appearance anxiety 
(AAI score) and Component 2 (unusual feelings and perceptions) scores from the 
mirror view PCA.
Figure S17. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of body dysmorphic-type 
beliefs (MGQ score) and Component 2 (unusual feelings and perceptions) scores from 
the mirror view PCA.
Figure S18. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of dissociative experiences 
(CADSS score) and Component 2 (unusual feelings and perceptions) scores from the 
mirror view PCA.
Figure S19. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of self objectification 
(SOQ score) and Component 2 (unusual feelings and perceptions) scores from the 
mirror view PCA.

Figure S20. Scatterplot of the relationship between degree of (a) delusion ideation 
frequency, (b) overall delusion ideation, (c) delusion ideation distress, (d) 
preoccupation, and (e) conviction and Component 2 (unusual feelings and 
perceptions) scores from the mirror view PCA.

Highlights
• Healthy participants viewed their body for 5 minutes directly and in a mirror
• PCA was used to explore the subjective experience of the body
• The same two PCA components were found for direct and mirror view
• Seeing the body directly and in a mirror is experienced as subjectively equivalent
